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Claude Shannon proved in 1949 that information-theoretic-secure encryption is possible if the encryption key
is used only once, is random, and is at least as long as the message itself. Notwithstanding, when information is
encoded in a quantum system, the phenomenon of quantum data locking allows one to encrypt a message with
a shorter key and still provide information-theoretic security. We present one of the first feasible experimental
demonstrations of quantum data locking for direct communication and propose a scheme for a quantum enigma
machine that encrypts 6 bits per photon (containing messages, new encryption keys, and forward error correction
bits) with less than 6 bits per photon of encryption key while remaining information-theoretically secure.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental results of classical information the-
ory, due to Claude Shannon, is that the secure encryption of a
message against an adversary with infinite computing power,
i.e. information-theoretic security, requires the single use of a
random secret key at least of equal length [1]. Therefore, in
the classical setting, the use of a shorter key may jeapordize
the security of a communication protocol. Surprisingly, Shan-
non’s stringent criterion can be circumvented if information is
encoded in a quantum system. According to a phenomenon
known as quantum data locking (QDL), a short secret key can
encrypt a much longer message if the latter is encoded in a
quantum system, in such a way that the encryption is prov-
ably secure against an eavesdropper that intercepts and mea-
sures the quantum system [2–5].
Together with other uniquely quantum phenomena, such
as Bell inequalities and teleportation, QDL represents one
of the strongest violations of classical information theory in
the quantum setting. Quantum information theory shows that
some strong QDL protocols allow for information-theoretic
security while encrypting a message with a key that is ex-
ponentially shorter than the message itself. Here we present
one of the first experimental realizations of QDL as a “quan-
tum enigma machine” [6, 7], i.e., an optical implementation
of QDL, allowing secure direct communication under the as-
sumption that an adversary must periodically make measure-
ments on the intercepted quantum state. During the prepa-
ration of this manuscript, we became aware of an alternate
experiment performed at approximately the same time as ours
[8] that limits an eavesdropper’s accessible information to half
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that of the legitimate receiver by utilizing the protocol found
in [2]. Our experimental realization, which utilizes higher
dimensions in free-space propagation, allows us to limit an
eavesdropper’s accessible information to an arbitrarily small
amount. This allows us, in principle, to securely transfer 6
bits per photon of message, new secret key, and forward error
correction via direct secret communication while encrypting
each photon with a key of strictly less than 6 bits.
II. QUANTUM DATA LOCKING
In a QDL protocol, outlined in [2–5, 9], Alice attempts to
transmit messages encoded onto quantum states. Alice first
locks the data to be transmitted by applying a random unitary
operation on her quantum state, and finally sends the quantum
state through a public channel to Bob. Alice and Bob share
a private key describing which unitary operations Alice used
such that Bob can accurately perform the inverse unitary op-
erations and unlock the original message. The objective, for
what concerns the security of the protocol, is to guarantee that
an eavesdropper, Eve, cannot retrieve the original message if
she intercepts the quantum state without access to the private
key. This security is provided by limiting Eve’s accessible
information, being defined as the maximum classical mutual
information between the message Alice is trying to send and
an optimal measurement performed by Eve [2].
The security of QDL is granted under proper assumptions.
While we allow Eve to have unbounded computational power,
we must assume she has imperfect quantum technology. In
particular, we must assume Eve has a quantum memory with
finite storage time. This assumption compensates for the fact
that, in general, the accessible information is not composable
[10]. Composable security asserts that the security of individ-
ual communication protocols is preserved when used as sub-
routines within an overarching communication protocol [11].
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2Note that the same constraints can also be imposed on Bob,
meaning QDL does not require Bob to have better quantum
technology than Eve. The assumptions of QDL are more strin-
gent than those of standard Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
and are analogous to QKD systems utilizing a Bounded Stor-
age Model which secures a key with the assumption that Eve
has a finite amount of memory, whether classical or quantum
[12]. QDL requires that Eve has a quantum memory with
finite storage time along with the use of a pre-shared secret
key. However, theory states that QDL can tolerate higher loss.
For example, in the case presented in [9], QDL can tolerate
up to 66% channel loss, as opposed to 50% loss in the most
robust QKD protocols, while also promising unprecedented
high rates [7, 9, 13, 14].
In a typical QDL protocol, Alice and Bob first decide on the
number of possible messages M that will be encoded into n
quantum states (n single photons in our case) and transmitted
over n uses of a quantum channel. Each message will then be
log2(M) bits in length. Next, they then privately agree on a
log2(K) bit key that specifies a line within a public code book
containing K unique lines. Each line of the code book spec-
ifies the sequence of n unitary operations on the n quantum
states that Alice sends to Bob. Specifically, each line lists a se-
quence of n random seeds that generate a pseudo-random uni-
tary transform. Alice applies these unitary transforms to the n
quantum states and sends them to Bob. The total number of all
possible enciphered states is N = MK. For efficient QDL,
we require K  M [13, 15]. If Eve knew precisely which
of the N possible enciphered states was sent, she could pre-
pareK copies of the full transmission and perform the inverse
of the K unitary transformation sequences on identical copies
of the enciphered state to determine which message was sent.
However, Eve cannot identify the original message from the
set of possible N states with only n  N measurements, as-
suring the security of this protocol.
Under proper scenarios, QDL has the potential to replace
some QKD systems and may serve as a better option to alter-
nate Quantum-Secure Direct Communication (QSDC) proto-
cols. QDL has, in principle, the possibility of being a valuable
alternative to standard QKD because QDL boasts a higher
secure-key rate (per photon) when the limited quantum mem-
ory of an eavesdropper becomes a practical assumption [13].
Of course, the actual field-tested secure bit rate, based upon
technological limitations and channel losses, will be the fi-
nal deciding factor as to whether QDL or QKD is used. It
should also be noted that QDL holds many similarities with
QSDC, whose goal is to transmit information directly over
a quantum channel without having to first establish a shared
private key, if at all. The core of QSDC security relies on fun-
damental quantum principles such as the no-cloning theorem
[16], uncertainty principles, or quantum correlations. QSDC
protocols ensure security through the ability to either detect
an eavesdropper before information is leaked [17, 18] or to
prevent information leakage by denying outsiders access to
the entirety of a correlated quantum state [19–22]. In many
cases, these protocols either require that a single quantum
state is transmitted over a quantum channel twice (from Al-
ice, out to Bob, and then back) or necessitate the distribu-
tion of a correlated, possibly entangled, quantum state. It is
clear that QDL depends on the initial establishment of a short
secret key. However, none of the alternate QSDC protocols
appear to utilize the locking effect afforded through the def-
inition of the accessible information. In addition, because of
the experimental difficulty with distributing entangled states
or with losses from having a state traverse a quantum channel
twice, no experimental demonstrations have been published in
a peer-reviewed journal to date.
III. QUANTUM ENIGMA
In a proof-of-principle experimental demonstration of QDL
presented in Fig. 1, we focus on one possible application for
QSDC and encode 6 bits of information onto a single pho-
ton while encrypting that information with less than 6 bits of
key. Single photon pairs are generated from the process of de-
generate Spontaneous Parametric Down Conversion (SPDC)
[23] whereby a pump-laser photon at 325 nm down-converts
into two 650 nm daughter photons, referred to here as signal
and herald. The herald photon, detected by Alice’s Avalanche
Photodiode Detector (APD), is used to herald the presence of
the signal photon on Bob’s detector. Alice uses a 512×512
pixel Spatial Light Modulator (SLM) to both encode infor-
mation in the transverse linear phase of the signal photon’s
wavefront while also operating with a scrambling unitary op-
eration specified by one of n random number generating seeds
in each line of the code book. Each scrambling unitary is a
128×128 superpixel random binary phase mask composed of
0 and pi relative phase shifts. Utilizing properties of Fourier
optics, a linear phase shift on a wavefront corresponds to a
linear shift in the focal point of that wavefront’s Fraunhofer
diffraction pattern [24] while a scrambled wavefront has no
well-defined focal point. Alice adds 1 of 64 linear phase pat-
terns to a scrambling phase pattern and uses the resulting pat-
tern to phase modulate her single photon with an SLM. She
then transmits this photon to Bob. Once Bob receives the
photon, he applies an inverse scrambling phase unitary with
his SLM and focuses the resulting state onto a high-efficiency
8×8 single-photon-detecting nanowire array [25]. This de-
tector array is cryogenically cooled to 0.8 K and was used
because it exhibits one of the lowest dark count rates of any
single-photon-detecting array to date (an essential criterion
for accurately transmitting messages). If Bob unscrambles the
wavefront properly, the photon will register on a detector pixel
of Alice’s choosing. Hence, linear phases encoded up to 6 bits
of encrypted information per photon.
The effectiveness of the scrambling unitaries is depicted in
Fig. 2. Alice encrypted each of the 64 settings over 600 times
while Bob used the secret key to unscramble the wavefront.
Eve’s optimal distribution was obtained in a best-case scenario
using Bob’s properly aligned SLM and detector while lacking
the secret key. Therefore, she was forced to randomly guess
inverse unitaries in an attempt to maximize her mutual infor-
mation. The result of Bob’s measurements are highly cor-
related with Alice’s intended messages. Alternatively, Eve’s
measurements follow a highly-uncorrelated flat distribution
3FIG. 1. Experimental Diagram: Ultraviolet (UV) laser light passes through a nonlinear bismuth triborate (BiBO) crystal to produce down-
converted signal-herald photon pairs. After separating the photons with a beamsplitter (BS), Alice uses single-mode (SM) fibers to transfer
the herald photon to an Avalance Photo Diode (APD) detector while sending the signal photon to be polarization prepped by a Quarter-Wave
Plate (QWP), a Half-Wave Plate (HWP), and a polarizer for use with a Spatial Light Modulator (SLM). Alice then phase-modulates her signal
photon with an SLM to encode and lock information. Imaging lenses map Alice’s wavefront to Bob’s SLM where he applies an inverse unitary
phase operation to unlock the information before focusing his light onto a low-noise cryogenically cooled 8×8 pixel nanowire array. Bob then
uses the heralded detection event sent by Alice to herald the arrival of single photons. See the appendix for details.
for the probability of photodetection.
Within the appendix, we derive the necessary key rates
needed to secure this system according to the accessible in-
formation. The experimental scheme realizes the theoretical
proposal presented in [9]. A crucial parameter to determine
the secret key length is the dimension of the quantum com-
munication channel d. Roughly speaking, the setting with the
most efficient use of key is when d is comparable to the num-
ber of possible messages per photon. Our detector limits the
set of possible messages per photon to 64. We utilize free-
space propagation and present two potential ways to estimate
d. A practical estimate is to assume that the eavesdropper is
also constrained to measure with an 8×8 detector array identi-
cal to Bob’s. In this way, the effective dimension is not greater
than d = 64. An alternate, more conservative, estimate is to
consider the transverse beam profile within the plane of the
detector and evaluate the total number of unique (i.e., non-
overlapping) spatial modes that may exist according to the
propagation characteristics of the system. We use the prac-
tical estimate, d = 64, here within the main article. See the
appendix for details along with alternate results for the con-
servative estimate.
IV. SECRET KEY & MESSAGE TRANSMISSION WITH
FORWARD ERROR CORRECTION
In order to reliably transmit messages and new secret keys,
error rates must be low enough such that the data packets
can be reliably transmitted and decrypted by Bob. Practi-
cally, these errors will never be omitted entirely. The over-
all error rate between what Alice transmits and what Bob
receives is approximately 10%, originating from a combina-
tion of sources including SPDC photons scattering from the
SLM’s and background photons. However, this error rate is
low enough such that it may be overcome by implementing
Forward Error Correction (FEC) protocols. Including FEC
means that our 6-bit photon must be partitioned to contain er-
ror correction, key, and message bits. FEC requires redun-
dancy to detect and correct errors. Unfortunately, this redun-
dancy can aid Eve in her attempt to unlock the message. As
shown in [9], Alice and Bob can implement error correction
while maintaining security, at the cost of a higher key con-
sumption rate, where the extra key is used to cover up the
redundancy in the error correction code.
We used Reed-Solomon error correction codes [26]. Reed-
Solomon codes detect and correct errors on symbols (where
each symbol is represented by several bits) rather than correct-
ing errors on individual bits. Thus, Reed-Solomon codes treat
all bit errors on a single symbol as a single error. This is partic-
ularly advantageous to our experiment where a 6-bit symbol is
encoded by a single photon. Reed-Solomon codes also trans-
mit in packets of symbols, or ‘blocks’, with the largest block
length being 2s − 1 symbols for an s-bit alphabet. Hence,
transmissions with 63 symbols per packet correspond to the
most efficient use of Reed-Solomon codes for our 6-bit alpha-
bet. We implemented Reed-Solomon (63,x) protocols that
encode in packets of 63 symbols, or 63 photons as is our case,
where x < 63 is the number of symbols in the original data
packet containing a message and new secret key. Of those 63
symbols, 63 − x symbols encode the redundant information.
A Reed-Solomon (63,x) code can correct up to (63 − x)/2
4FIG. 2. Joint Probability Distributions: The joint probability dis-
tributions presented are derived from experimental data where Al-
ice scans through 64 messages while locking the information with
128×128 pixel binary phase masks. a, Eve randomly guesses at
binary phase masks in hopes of unlocking the information while be-
ing allowed, in a worst-case scenario, to use Bob’s properly aligned
detector. b, Bob unlocks the messages with binary phase masks pre-
scribed according to a secret key. The distribution with the highest
mutual information is a normalized identity matrix with diagonal el-
ements equal to 1/64 ≈ .016. The comb structure seen in (b) is due
to a gradient of error rates across the detector array, possibly due to
a slight misalignment of a lenslet array placed above the detector ar-
ray. In summary, Alice and Eve’s distribution is highly uncorrelated
while Alice and Bob’s distribution is highly correlated attesting the
effectiveness of this locking method.
symbol errors. The fractional redundancy of the useful infor-
mation is (63− x)/x. To cover up this redundancy, the secret
key is scaled to be 1 + (63 − x)/x times larger. This leaves
less information that we can allocate towards an encrypted
message. Because the key rate is larger, the code book length
will be exponentially larger. The number of bits allocated to
message, redundancy, and new secret key operate as a func-
tion of the Reed-Solomon (63,x) code used. Because of this,
Fig. 3 presents the bit-allocation per photon as a function of
the Reed-Solomon (63,x) code implemented for n = 63 uses
of the channel. Note that the allocated new secret-key bits
within Fig. 3 are equal to the number of consumed-key bits
used to secure the transmission of the 6-bit photon.
Ideally, a single photon source will transmit a single pho-
ton on demand. Such sources are still in development, forcing
FIG. 3. Single-Photon Bit Allocation (for n = 63 channel uses):
The plot above lists how many secret-key bits (blue squares), FEC re-
dundancy bits (red triangles), and message bits (black diamonds) are
encoded within a single 6-bit photon as a function of Reed-Solomon
(63,x) codes. The new secret-key plot shows the necessary alloca-
tion of bits to replenish the consumed key. Any FEC redundancy
requires the consumption of more secret key. Moving from n = 63
channel uses to n = 126 or higher will result in less secret-key con-
sumption per photon and larger message-bit capacities. Messages
bits may be allocated to either additional key or secret messages for
direct communication.
us to rely upon heralding with SPDC. SPDC dictates that nu-
merous down-converted events will take place randomly per
SLM setting. While alternate versions of a quantum enigma
machine may allow the transmission of more than one photon
per channel use (as in [14]), this version of a quantum enigma
machine should have an accurate measure of the losses and
only allow one photon transmission per channel use. These
two points are, perhaps, the greatest limitations of a quantum
enigma machine. However, the strength of a quantum enigma
machine is not based on novel hardware, nor a particularly
clever protocol. The strength of a quantum enigma machine
resides in the use of a weaker security definition in compari-
son to QKD. Therefore, many of the techniques used in QKD
to cope with photon splitting an other attacks can be equally
applied to a quantum enigma machine.
To demonstrate the capability of this system if we were us-
ing an ideal single-photon source, we recorded only the first
heralded event per SLM setting and neglected the rest. Fig-
ure 10 presents the success rates for different Reed-Solomon
error correction protocols as a function of the number of key
and message symbols x. When only considering our first-
count heralded events, we transmitted 420 packets of 63 sym-
bols with varying error correction capabilities. Reducing the
available capacity for message symbols allowed for more re-
dundancy symbols with higher transmission success rates. In
our analysis, a single incorrect symbol in the corrected packet
corresponded to a complete failure of the entire packet. Fig-
ure 10 also plots the available message capacity per photon
as a function of x and the number of channel uses n. Be-
cause the Reed-Solomon codes require us to transmit in pack-
ets of 63 symbols, we chose to make the number of channel
uses n a multiple of 63. When limiting the message to 1.02
5bits per photon (x = 35, n = 126) after having already al-
located space to FEC and a new secret key, we achieved a
99.5% packet success rate. While our bit-error ratio is sig-
nificantly larger than telecommunications standards (typically
less than 10−6 bit errors per bits transmitted [27]), the ex-
periment is merely meant as a proof-of-principle demonstra-
tion of our ability to lock message and new secret keys with
success rates approaching 100%. Clearly, errors in the trans-
mission will destroy Bob’s ability to decode future messages.
Additional redundancy bits or different forms of error reduc-
tion and error correction will be required to make a quantum
enigma machine a practical form of secure communication.
FIG. 4. Reed-Solomon Error Correction Success Rates: The suc-
cess rates for a Reed-Solomon (63, x) code are presented, where x is
the number of 6-bit symbols containing the new key and message and
63 is the total number of packet symbols after including redundancy.
This data was obtained after transmitting packets of 63 photons 420
times. The plot also depicts the available capacity for message bits
per photon as a function of x and the number of channel uses n.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we demonstrated the phenomenon of quan-
tum data locking with a proof-of-principle experiment where
we applied an information-theoretic secure encryption scheme
to lock 6 bits per photon while using less than 6 bits per photon
of secret key. To demonstrate the feasibility of locking both
messages and new secret keys, we securely applied a Reed-
Solomon (63,35) protocol and transmitted 420 packets of 63
photons (where each photon was a 6 bit symbol containing
1 bit of message, 2.3 bits of new secret key, and 2.7 bits of
redundancy) with a success rate of 99.5%.
Although QDL has been known for about ten years, only
a handful of theoretical papers were devoted to its applica-
tion to cryptography and our present contribution presents the
first experimental implementation. However, since the biggest
difference between QDL and standard QKD is not in the hard-
ware but in the security definition, we believe that most of the
knowledge accumulated in standard QKD (e.g., analysis of
finite-size protocols, use of decoy states, measurement device
independence) can be straightforwardly transferred to QDL.
While our implementation relies on free-space propagation,
long-distance direct communication requires that QDL be tai-
lored for fiber-optic transmission using, for example, phase
modulation [15] or the continuous-variable modulation of co-
herent states with homodyne detection [7, 14, 28]. To elabo-
rate, a phase-modulation scheme could be realized by encod-
ing information in time and scrambling that information by
random phase delays. Alice would apply a time delay to a
signal photon to encode information and then pass the signal
photon through a positive group-velocity dispersive (GVD)
medium [29] to coherently spread the photon over d time bins.
Alice would then apply random phases, specified by a private
key and a public code book, to each time bin to scramble the
time signature. To recover the timing information, Bob would
apply the corresponding phase delays, specified by the public
code book, to each time bin and then pass the resulting photon
through an appropriate negative GVD medium.
Our free-space experiment presents a fundamentally sim-
ple implementation that is a stepping stone to efficient
information-theoretic secure direct communication. This
quantum enigma machine marks one of the first experiments
to implement QDL, circumventing Shannon’s standard, in an
attempt to remain information-theoretically secure under the
assumption that both legitimate receivers and adversaries have
quantum memories with limited storage times.
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6Appendix: Secret-key length
Quantum Data Locking provides a secure method of in-
formation transfer such that two legitimate parties, Alice and
Bob, can effectively communicate encrypted information via
quantum states over a d dimension quantum channel while
limiting an eavesdropper, Eve, to an accessible information of
Iacc ≤ O ( log2 (dn)) (A.1)
bits when using a quantum channel n times where  grows
exponentially small with channel use, i.e.  = 2−n
c
for c < 1.
The foundation for our theory is elegantly outlined in [9]. Our
experiment encodes a 6 bit symbol x onto a single photon state
|xc〉 for c = 1, 2, ..., 64. The transmission of a single photon
counts as a single use of the quantum channel. Hence, for
Alice to encode one of M = 64n messages within n photons,
she must prepare the quantum state
|ψc〉 =
n⊗
j=1
|xj,c〉 (A.2)
and encodes each photon with a unitary transformation U (s)
for s = 1, 2, ...,Kn. The resulting unitary operating on the n
photon state is
U (s) =
n⊗
j=1
U
(s)
j . (A.3)
The n photon encrypted quantum state is then
|ψ(s)c 〉 = U (s)|ψc〉 =
n⊗
j=1
U
(s)
j |xj,c〉. (A.4)
According to [9], Eqn. A.1 is satisfied provided the number
of scrambling unitaries satisfies
Kn > max

2
(
2d
d+1
)n (
1
2 lnM +
2
3 ln
5

)
dn
M
4 ln 2 ln dn
2
(A.5)
where the maximum is taken over the two equations, M =
64n, and  = 2−n
c
for c < 1.
The only unknown variable within Eqns. A.1 and A.5 is
the dimension of the communication channel d. Because our
quantum enigma machine relies on free-space propagation
that employs a lenslet array immediately before the detector,
the channel dimension can be estimated in two ways.
1. Practical estimate of d
The first estimate of d follows a practical line of reasoning
that considers only the spatial modes that can be measured
after propagating through the lenslet array. While there are
numerous spatial modes that may exist within the plane of
Bob and Eve’s detector, only those modes that overlap the 8×8
FIG. 5. Secret-key consumption rate: Letting d = 64, Eqn. A.5
is used to calculate the amount of key bits per photon (assuming one
photon per channel use). QDL is only possible if (log2Kn)/n < 6;
we see that QDL is possible for most values of n.
lenslet array will be mapped to the 8×8 nanowire array. This
means there are only 64 possible distinguishable modes. All
other spatial modes have 100% loss and cannot be used to
transmit information. If we limit Eve to the same constraints
as Bob, then Eve can only measure the modes that overlap
with her 8×8 lenslet array. Since each lens within the lenslet
maps all light impinging on them to one unique nanowire, all
detectable transmissions must exist within a space of d = 64
dimensions.
Letting d = 64, M = 64n, and  = 2−
√
n, Eqn. A.5 is
used to derive the necessary amount of key per photon and is
plotted within Fig. 5.
In addition to the standard QDL protocol, we also apply
Reed-Solomon forward error correction (FEC) codes using
symbols of 6 bits per photon. The optimal block length for
a Reed-Solomon code with a 6-bit alphabet is 63 symbols
within a block. Thus, it is reasonable to set the number of
channel uses to be a multiple of 63. In our analysis, we con-
sider two cases: n = 63 and n = 126.
From Fig. 5, we show that (log2K63)/63 > 1.434 bits
per photon and (log2K126)/126 > 1.287 bits per photon is
enough to limit Iacc to only a few bits compared to having
transmitted 378 bits and 756 bits respectively. The resulting
message bit capacities and Reed Solomon success rates are
shown within the main article.
2. Conservative estimate of d
A more conservative estimate of the channel dimension d
is obtained by considering all of the possible distinguishable
spatial modes that can exist after passing through an infi-
nite dimensional lenslet array, as opposed to only those that
can be measured. The lenslet array effectively maps a high-
dimensional spatial pattern to a lower dimensional one. d is
obtained by dividing the average distribution in a plane of
Eve’s detector by the area of a circular lens within an infi-
nite dimensional lenslet array. This effectively overestimates
the dimension because a circular lens was used within the ex-
7periment and areas between the circular lenses correspond to
‘dead-space’ where light cannot be mapped to a detector. The
choice of a circular lens area, instead of a square area, results
in a larger d and an over-secure key rate.
Eve’s average distribution was obtained by modeling the
propagation of light through the system. Our experimental
setup used a 512×512 pixel spatial light modulator (SLM)
to both scramble and encode linear phases onto a single pho-
ton projected from a single-mode optical fiber. The transverse
profile of our single-photon state takes the form
|xc〉 = 1N
∞∫∫
−∞
ei(φx,cx+φy,cy)e
{
− x2+y2
4σ2
}
dx dy |x, y〉
(A.6)
whereN is a normalization constant and φx,c and φy,c are the
necessary linear phases to encode a message with specifier
c = 1, 2, ..., 64 into the transverse profile of a single photon
state whose probability distribution follows a Gaussian with
a standard deviation of σ. Using the SLM, Alice simultane-
ously applies the linear phase encoding the message and en-
crypts each photon wavefront with a scrambling unitary oper-
ation U (s)j . The unitary operations are composed of random
binary phase patterns containing the values 0 and pi. While
each scrambling unitary consists of 512×512 SLM pixels, su-
perpixels composed of 4×4 SLM pixels were used to generate
128×128 superpixel resolution random binary phase patterns.
The lower resolution binary patterns aided in the alignment of
Alice’s SLM to the image plane on Bob’s SLM. Each unitary
has the form
U
(s)
j =
∑
x
∑
y
eiθk(x,y)|x, y〉〈x, y| (A.7)
such that θk(x, y) is a random binary variable (0 or pi) cho-
sen from a uniform distribution. This probability amplitude is
propagated to the focal point of a lens using a Fourier trans-
form defined by
G(fx, fy) =
∞∫∫
−∞
g(x, y)e−2pii(fxx+fyy)dx dy
= F [g(x, y)] .
(A.8)
To obtain the probability distribution in either Bob’s or Eve’s
focal plane (PBob or PEve), we need only consider the follow-
ing:
PBob =
1
N
∣∣∣∣F [e{− x2+y24σ2 }ei(φx,cx+φy,cy)]∣∣∣∣2 (A.9)
PEve =
1
N
∣∣∣∣∣F
[∑
x,y
e
{
− x2+y2
4σ2
}
ei(φx,cx+φy,cy+θk(x,y))
]∣∣∣∣∣
2
(A.10)
where N is the necessary normalization constant to form a
probability distribution.
While these probability distributions are infinite dimen-
sional, the actual detector system within the experiment con-
tained a lenslet array placed one focal length in front of the
FIG. 6. Gaussian fit to beam profile: A Gaussian function was fit
to the original beam profile seen within the experiment. This fit was
used to find the original beam profile on Alice’s SLM for a numerical
simulation.
nanowire array. The lenslet array mapped the area of a sin-
gle lens onto a single nanowire. If we extend the lenslet array
to operate on the entire distribution, Eve’s distribution is then
effectively discretized by the area of a lens. The resulting di-
mension d is then the ratio of Eve’s average distribution area
to the area of a single lens within the lenslet array.
The actual Fourier transform probability distributions, re-
siding within the detector’s cryostat, were not measured.
However, we can infer both the area of Eve’s distribution and
the diameter of lenses within the lenslet array by knowing the
initial beam profile on Alice’s detector and by using the 64
nanowire phase settings within the experiment. Magnification
effects, used to focus the light down onto a single nanowire,
are not required within the calculation of d. The magnification
is not required because it will inevitably cancel when calcu-
lating the ratio of Eve’s distribution area to the lens area. We
chose to perform this calculation numerically.
The lens area was calculated using experimental settings.
Linear phase settings were optimized within the experiment
to have focal points centered on each nanowire. Hence, the
linear phases should be an accurate measure of the lens spac-
ing within the lenslet array. Using these linear phase settings,
we Fourier transformed them to find the lens centers. The
lens separations were found in units of pixels (relative to the
resolution of the numerical Fourier transform). The Fourier
transform was zero padded to resolve fine details – one pixel
on Alice’s SLM was mapped into 9 Fourier transform pixels.
To obtain the average area of Eve’s distribution, the relative
area of the beam profile on a 512×512 pixel SLM needed to
be calculated to perform a numerical simulation. The relative
area of the initial beam on the SLM (in units of SLM pixels)
was obtained by first measuring the collimated beam profile
found in the actual experiment. Using the asphercal lens from
the experiment to collimate light emitted from a single-mode
optical fiber, the beam profile was imaged with a camera and
a Gaussian function was then fit to this profile, as shown in
8FIG. 7. Eve’s average distribution: This distribution was ob-
tained by averaging over each of the 64 scrambled messages 300
times whereby a different random phase pattern was used for each
scrambling operation. The lenslet array, calculated from experimen-
tal parameters, is outline in white.
Fig. 6. Knowing the pixel sizes for the camera and SLM,
we calculated the necessary standard deviation of a Gaussian
beam such that its profile would fill the same relative area on
our SLM for the numerical simulation.
Eve’s probability distribution was calculated by averaging
over each of the 64 possible messages. Each message was
scrambled 300 times by different random 128× 128 binary
phase patterns composed of 0 and pi phase shifts. After av-
eraging over each of the 64 messages, the distribution was
thresholded, keeping only those values within a 4σ radius of
the resulting zero-order distribution. The average distribution
can be seen in Fig. 7. Notice the size of this distribution in
comparison to the lenslet size. To approximate the dimension
of the communication channel, the number of non-zero pixels
within a 4σ radius of Eve’s average distribution was divided
by the lenslet area. This simulation was done 10 times, while
averaging over 300 scrambling operations for each of the 64
messages, to arrive at a dimension d = 644.8± 0.8.
Within the actual experiment, the lenslet array was placed
approximately 1 focal length away from the nanowire array.
Hence, Bob and Eve would not have placed their lenslet in the
focus of their Fourier transform lens. The degree of misfo-
cus can be accounted for by introducing a misfocus operator
into the propagation equations taking the form of a quadratic
phase factor associated with a spherical lens. We describe the
misfocus by an operator of the form
Ferror =
∑
x
∑
y
eiα(x
2+y2)|x, y〉〈x, y| (A.11)
where α  1. Note, this quadratic phase must be applied
before the Fourier transform.
Repeating the previous simulation with any reasonable de-
gree of misfocus (up to a maximum crosstalk error of 50% –
significantly larger than in the actual experiment), we always
FIG. 8. Secret-key consumption rate: Letting d = 650, Eqn. A.5
is used to calculate the amount of key bits per photon (assuming one
photon per channel use). QDL is only possible if (log2Kn)/n < 6;
we see that QDL is possible for most values of n. For n & 50, a key
size just under 4 bits per photon is sufficient for QDL and has the
potential to enable the use of error correcting codes.
obtain a smaller channel dimension d compared to that of the
previous simulation with no misfocus. Hence, the largest pos-
sible dimension is rounded up slightly to d = 650 to err on the
side of security. Overestimating slightly requires a longer key,
meaning we can transmit fewer message bits over n uses of
the channel. However, sacrificing communication bits within
reason is a safer alternative to not limiting Iacc sufficiently.
Calculating the necessary key rates for n = 63 and n = 126
while letting d = 650, M = 64n, and  = 2−
√
n, Fig.
8 plots (log2Kn)/n to arrive at the necessary amount of
key bits per photon to secure the transmission. As long as
(log2Kn)/n < 6, QDL is possible for given n. From the
plot, we show that (log2K63)/63 > 3.757 bits per photon
and (log2K126)/126 > 3.611 bits per photon is enough to
limit Iacc to only a few bits compared to having transmitted
378 bits and 756 bits respectively. While the two different
values of (log2Kn)/n for different n calculated here vary
only slightly, the option to move from n = 63 to n = 126
or higher may have a profound impact on the available mes-
sage bits once the redundancy of the Reed-Solomon codes has
been accounted for, i.e. the key bits are scaled linearly with
the redundancy corresponding to an exponential change in the
code book size. Because the amount of allocated message, re-
dundancy, and key bits depend on the Reed-Solomon (63,x)
code used, Fig. 9 plots bit allocation within a 6-bit photon for
n = 63 uses of the channel as a function of x. Again, note that
the new secret-key bit plot is equal to the consumed key bits
necessary to secure the transmission of the 6-bit photon for
n = 63 uses of the channel. Also notice that QDL with FEC
becomes impossible once the message-bit capacity becomes
0. Allocating a larger number of channel uses n > 63 will be
required to reduce the key length and allow for more message
and redundancy bits.
The corresponding impact on the available message bits per
photon are shown in Fig. 10. QDL is still possible, but the
9FIG. 9. Single-photon bit allocation (for n = 63 channel uses):
The plot above lists how many secret-key bits (blue squares), FEC re-
dundancy bits (red triangles), and message bits (black diamonds) are
encoded within a single 6-bit photon as a function of Reed-Solomon
(63,x) codes for a channel dimension d = 650. The new secret-key
plot shows the necessary allocation of bits to replenish the consumed
key. Any FEC redundancy requires the consumption of more se-
cret key. Moving from n = 63 to higher values will result in less
secret-key consumption per photon and larger message-bit capacities
as the key asymptotically approaches a constant. The Reed-Solomon
(63, 51) code holds the largest Reed-Solomon error correcting capa-
bility for d = 650 and n = 63.
FIG. 10. Reed-Solomon error correction success rates: The suc-
cess rates for a Reed-Solomon (63,x) code are presented, where x is
the number of 6-bit symbols containing the new key and message and
63 is the total number of packet symbols after including redundancy.
This data was obtained after transmitting packets of 63 photons 420
times. The plot also depicts the available capacity for message bits
per photon as a function of both x and the number of channel uses
n after allocating the necessary bits to refresh a secret encryption
key obtained from Eqn. A.5 with d = 650. From the plot, we see
that less key is required for n = 126 resulting in a higher message
capacity.
Reed-Solomon code is not sufficient to correct the majority of
errors while providing message transmission capabilities on
top of new secret-key distribution.
Moving forward, in order to utilize QDL systems operat-
ing over high-dimensional quantum channels, either detector
systems must improve to make the available message space
larger (i.e., increasing the efficiency of key use), or more effi-
cient FEC protocols must be implemented to increase the error
correcting capability with fewer redundancy bits.
Appendix: Additional experimental details
Single photon pairs were generated through type-I degen-
erate Spontaneous Parametric Down Conversion (SPDC) us-
ing a nonlinear bismuth triborate (BiBO) crystal. Ultraviolet
(UV) laser light at 325 nm first passed through a notch filter
to clean the pump beam. The UV light was later filtered out
with a pump filter while passing the 650 nm down-converted
signal and herald photons. The signal and herald photons
were then separated into different paths by a 50/50 beamsplit-
ter and coupled into single-mode fibers. The signal photon
was launched, collimated, and then prepared in a polarization
state to be phase modulated by a polarization sensitive Mead-
owlark 512×512 pixel liquid crystal reflective type SLM. Alice
modulated her state with both a linear phase and a scrambling
phase mask. The linear phase was chosen from a set of 64 lin-
ear phases that directed photons to a specific nanowire within
the nanowire array. Hence, linear phases encoded 6 bits of
information. Imaging optics within Eve’s domain mapped the
scrambled state from Alice’s SLM to Bob’s SLM. Bob phase
modulated his state with the inverse scrambling unitary oper-
ation before focusing the light onto his 8×8 single-photon-
detecting nanowire array [25]. The nanowires were cryogeni-
cally cooled to 0.8 K and were covered with an 8×8 lenslet
array. Each lenslet was 150 µm in diameter and focused light
onto each nanowire. If Bob applied the correct inverse scram-
bling unitary operation, only a single nanowire should receive
photons. Alice’s PerkinElmer Avalanche Photodiode (APD)
was used to herald the presence of a signal photon on Bob’s
detector using high speed correlating electronics. We were un-
able to guarantee that a single photon was transmitted through
the channel for each SLM setting (corresponding to one use
of the channel). To demonstrate the potential of this imple-
mentation once single-photon sources become commercially
available, we only recorded the first heralded event per SLM
setting in our message-passing data analysis with FEC.
Because of the losses within the system (including detec-
tors, SLM’s, optics, and polarizers outside of Eve’s domain),
we assumed a weak-locking capacity [7] where Eve does not
have access to Alice’s SLM. While the 4F imaging system
within Eve’s domain contained anti-reflection coatings, we
neglected the losses that could be due to Eve. However, the
experiment is meant as a proof-of-principle example because
we could not alleviate the losses due to all other optical com-
ponents and equipment. If these losses can be accurately ac-
counted for, it has been shown in [6] that security according
to a strong locking capacity, where Eve has direct access to
a noiseless state from Alice’s SLM [7], can still be obtained
when dealing with an arbitrary amount of loss by making both
the code book and the dimension of Alice’s system larger.
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